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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal policy concerned with the government’s choice regarding the optimal use of 
taxation and government spending to control and adjust the aggregate demand in the 
economy. Monetary policy refers to the central bank’s control regarding the availability 
of credit in the economy to achieve the objective of price stability and this control can be 
exerted through money supply and interest rate channel. The ultimate objective of the 
both policies is to maximise the overall welfare of the society which can be achieved by 
keeping the inflation rate low and employment at its potential level. 
There are number of channels in which fiscal policy can impinge on monetary 
policy. An expansionary fiscal policy leads to an expansionary monetary policy, which 
may in turn fuel inflation and appreciate the domestic currency and that cause 
deterioration in the balance of payments. On the other hand if government finances the 
deficit through the markets (in a non-monetary way) then the fear of crowding out of the 
private sector arise in the economy. On external side when a country is depending on 
foreign funding of domestic debt, this results in deterioration in the exchange rate and 
balance of payment. Another more direct channel of fiscal policy is the impact of indirect 
taxes on price level. Besides this, perceptions and expectations of the general public 
about the large and on going budget deficits and resultant borrowings requirements may 
prompt a lack of confidence in the economic prospects. At the same time when people 
realise that government is borrowing for its own good, they will conclude that this can 
lead to higher taxation levels in future and consequently they consume less and save 
more, that is so called Recardian equivalence.  
Even when the central bank is enjoying independence, and hence is not submitted 
to the fiscal needs of the government, the need to balance out the impact of expansionary 
fiscal policy on aggregate demand and inflation in the economy could prompt the central 
bank to tighten monetary policy, by raising interest rates or reducing credit in the 
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financial system. The resulting increase in the interest rates could dampen economic 
activity; attract short-term and easily reversible capital inflows thus adding to inflation 
and appreciation pressures on the currency, and at the end of the day damaging 
macroeconomic and financial stability. 
Severe budgetary problems sometimes may even lead the economy into crises. The 
lengths to which the monetary authority will go to control inflation depend on how 
monetary and fiscal policies are coordinated and conducted, and thus, the concepts of 
fiscal dominance and monetary dominance take on added importance. The economy is 
under fiscal dominance when the fiscal authority independently determines the current 
and future budget, defining the share of revenues from bonds and seigniorage. Whereas 
under the monetary dominance, government fine-tunes primary deficit to limit the debt 
accumulation and central bank does not monetise debt, see Sargent and Wallace (1981). 
Fiscal deficit causes inflation because governments that face long episodes of fiscal 
deficits find money creation as solution to finance the deficits leading to inflation as a 
monetary phenomenon Mishkin (2007). So it can be inferred that fiscal policy and 
monetary policy both are complex policy instrument with contradicting objectives and 
there is a strong need for policy integration and coordination for welfare maximisation. 
In Pakistan there was hardly any concept of coordination between these two 
important policies before the financial sector reforms which were initiated in 1989-90. 
Before that SBP was not independent and monetary policy was compliant to fiscal policy 
practically. This financial reforms and restructuring process compelled the monetary and 
fiscal policy coordination and a monetary and fiscal coordination board has been 
established in 1994. Its main objectives include the coordination among key policies i.e. 
fiscal policy, monetary policy and exchange rate policy and also to safeguard the possible 
consistency among macroeconomic targets of growth, inflation, fiscal, monetary and 
external accounts see Hanif and Arby (2007).  In Pakistan there are few studies which 
highlighted this issue of fiscal and monetary policy coordination including Agha and 
Khan (2006), Arby and Hanif (2007), Arby and Hanif (2010), Nasir, et al. (2010). The 
present study will attempt to explore the issue of coordination between two important 
macroeconomic policies in the recent time period and predominantly the focus is on 
investigating the monetary and fiscal policy responses to shocks in output and inflation. 
The study is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review of the 
selected studies briefly. Section 3 discussed the model and methodology and Section 4 
presents the data sources and variables construction. Section 5 presents the detailed 
results and Section 6 concludes the study.  
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The pioneer study done by Sargent and Wallace (1981) spotlight the potential 
difficulties of conducting monetary policy in an environment where fiscal policy 
dominates the coordination game played between two (monetary and fiscal) authorities. 
When the central bank is independent from the fiscal authority, it decides how much 
seigniorage revenue can be raised by setting its policy prior to the fiscal policy. The first 
mover central bank should enforce discipline on the fiscal authority, forcing it to select a 
sequence of primary surpluses (and debt) that is consistent with the sequence of money 
supplied by the monetary authority in terms of satisfying the government’s consolidated 
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intertemporal budget constraint. Sargent and Wallace’s analysis suggests that fiscal 
variables do not matter for price determination and, consequently, central banks 
committed to price stability can certainly deliver price stability regardless of fiscal policy. 
On the other hand, in a fiscal dominance regime, the fiscal authority moves first and 
defines the path of the primary surplus. Any adjustments made by the authority to avoid 
explosive debt paths must come in the form of seigniorage revenues. Given the 
predetermined path for the primary surplus, tight monetary policy can potentially result in 
higher, instead of lower inflation. Standard monetary policy responses to inflationary 
shocks will have perverse effects: monetary tightening today prompts higher interest 
rates, increases interest payments on the government’s debt, and requires expansionary 
monetary policy in the future to generate additional seigniorage revenue. So what will 
happen, rational agents anticipate increase in money creation in future and bid the price 
level up today. This is Sargent and Wallace’s unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. 
The notion that different combinations of potentially interdependent policy rules, 
implemented by fiscal and monetary authorities, may end up with distinctive equilibrium 
paths for nominal variables and affect the ability of monetary policy to control inflation is 
presented by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) and also Leeper (1991). Both studies showed 
the fact that the presence of passive central banks following monetary policies that are 
subservient to the fiscal authority’s behaviour leads to higher average inflation. The 
degree of interdependence between monetary and fiscal policy may also have its roots in 
institutional arrangements. To the extent that highly independent central banks may be 
less likely to care about the government’s fiscal needs in order to set its policy, central 
bank independence indices may be correlated with the degree of fiscal dominance and 
thus provide important insights regarding inflation outcomes, see Cuckierman (1992) 
Cuckierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993) and Sturn and de 
Haan (2001).   
The empirical relevance of the issue of the coordination between two policies has 
been examined in several papers. For instance in case of G-7 countries, the form of 
interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies was asymmetric across countries. 
Monetary policy was found to act in response of fiscal expansion in the US and the UK 
but no evidence of the same kind is found for France, Italy, and Germany, Muscatelli, et 
al. (2002) rather fiscal policy is prompted by monetary policy and also observed some 
regime changes in the interaction between them in France and Germany, Semmler and 
Zhang (2003). In case of emerging economies of Brazil and Argentina Zoli (2005) found 
the evidence of   fiscal dominance. For Pakistan, Agha and Khan (2006) indicated that 
inflation is a fiscal phenomenon and highlighted the fact that fiscal policy considerably 
influences the conduct of monetary policy. Arby and Hanif (2010) and Nasir, et al. 
(2010) found conflicting results that the integration between the two policies is weak and 
they have been executed independently. 
 
3.  MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
To test the issue empirically for Pakistan, the methodology developed by 
Nordhaus (1994) is adopted for the period 1980 to 2011. The approach used the 
unrestricted VAR model which consists of four variables, two macroeconomic variables 
which is represented by output or unemployment and inflation and other two are policy 
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variables which described the monetary and fiscal policy stance. The theoretical 
framework of the VAR model is derived from the objectives of monetary and fiscal 
policies. Objectives of the both policies are functions of inflation, unemployment and 
potential output gap, but weights assigned to them are different by the both policies. 
Monetary and fiscal authorities have different preferences; over the time period monetary 
policy is more concerned about low level of inflation and has no preference for fiscal 
deficit. Fiscal authority is more concerned about the low level of employment even at the 
cost of high inflation while neither of the two policies has a specific preferred level of 
interest rate. In this study it is assumed that monetary policy instrument is represented by 
interest rate r whereas fiscal instrument is indicated by S, fiscal surplus ratio. 
Using the above mentioned assumptions, to employ Nordhaus (1994) 
methodology, the starting point of the analysis is the utilities functions of the two 










 (u,p, g, S) … … … … … … … (2) 
Where U is the utility function of the authority whereas, unemployment rate, inflation 
and potential output is indicated by u, p and g respectively. According to Nordhaus 
(1994) unemployment rate the measuring the utilisation of resources in the economy and 
represented by output gap which is also function of the two macroeconomic policies       
(r and S).  
U = u (r, S) … … … … … … … (3) 
Inflation is assumed to be a function of output gap and expected rate of inflation is as: 
P = P (u) + P
e
 … … … … … … … (4) 
Expected inflation is depending on a backward looking component and actual inflation 
rate in the economy is given by the following expression: 
P
e
 =P + (1–  )PB … … … … … … … (5) 
By combining the expressions 4 and 5  
P = P (u)/ (1– ) + PB             0  ≤  < 1  
When  = 1 then inflation does not depending on backward looking price behaviour and 
unemployment rate is always at natural rate of unemployment that is P = P (U
N
). 
The potential growth indicated by g depends on investment ratio, which is equal to the 
sum of private and government saving ratio. But for simplification we assume that private 
saving is unaffected by monetary and fiscal policies. g=g(S) is a function of government 










{ u = u (r, S…), P (u)/ (1– ) + PB, g(S), S} 
Now we see that monetary and fiscal policies depend on unemployment, inflation 
and fiscal surplus. 
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As far as empirical analysis of the interaction between two is concerned we will 
use the VAR model in the study consisting of the four mentioned variables. Our simple 
VAR model will have the following structure: 
                        +          +          } +     
                        +          +          } +     
                        +          +          } +     
                        +          +          } +     
We analyses the responses of the different variables by using the Impulse 
Response Function from the VAR model. 
 
4.  DATA AND VARIABLES 
 The data sources for the study are International Financial Statistics and World 
Development Indicators. The study used time series data from 1980 to 2011. We have 
used interest rate as monetary policy variable and fiscal surplus ratio as fiscal policy 
variable. Surplus is defined by dividing the Surplus by GDP where Gross Domestic 
Product, GDP is the sum of gross value added by the resident producers in the economy. 
Consumer price index is used to measure inflation with the base year 2005. Finally 
unemployment is defined as the ratio of unemployed persons actively seeking 
employment to total labour force. 
 
5.  ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
5.1. Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 P r S u 
P(–1)  0.713328  30.12570 8.155491 –4.307838 
  (0.17618)  (9.07138)  (6.58443)  (5.20860) 
 [4.04883] [3.32096] [1.23860] [–0.82706] 
r(–1) 0.001944  0.571096 –0.092790  0.079719 
  (0.00257)  (0.13231)  (0.09603)  (0.07597) 
 [0.75670] [4.31649] [–0.96623] [1.04938] 
S(–1)  –0.005384  0.363579  0.400155  0.078729 
  (0.00409)  (0.21039)  (0.15271)  (0.12080) 
 [–1.31757] [1.72808] [2.62028] [0.65171] 
u(–1) –0.005374 –0.240532  0.477978  0.822681 
  (0.00394)  (0.20293)  (0.14730)  (0.11652) 
 [–1.36347] [–1.18527] [3.24495] [7.06038] 
C  0.100945  4.816930 –6.005507  1.160977 
  (0.04385)  (2.25786)  (1.63886)  (1.29642) 
 [ 2.30198] [2.13340] [–3.66444] [0.89553] 
R-squared  0.471902 0.733143  0.650477 0.780549 
  
The results of VAR test shows, that there is evidence of weak coordination 
between fiscal and monetary policy. Previous period’s surplus negatively affects interest 
rate but it is insignificant, as surplus increases the demand for loanable funds decreases 
by the government that pushes down the interest rate. Previous period’s interest rate 
negatively affects the surplus, as interest rate increases due to the crowding out 
investment, employment and output also declines, there is a need to increase in the 
government expenditures, so that surplus should decline.  
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5.2.  Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  r does not Granger Cause P 31  0.84128  0.36687 
  P does not Granger Cause r  11.2839  0.00227 
  S does not Granger Cause P 31  0.61360  0.44001 
  P does not Granger Cause S  0.19177  0.66481 
  u does not Granger Cause P 31  0.35857  0.55412 
  P does not Granger Cause u  0.10383  0.74967 
  S does not Granger Cause r 31  1.00170  0.32547 
  r does not Granger Cause S  0.16262  0.68982 
  u does not Granger Cause r 31  0.16239  0.69003 
  r does not Granger Cause u  0.37802  0.54363 
  u does not Granger Cause S 31  10.1108  0.00358 
  S does not Granger Cause u  0.26032  0.61390 
 
Results of Granger Causality Test showed that there is no evidence of causality 
between fiscal and monetary policy rather there is unidirectional causality running from 
unemployment to fiscal surplus, as unemployment increases it shows that government has 
decreased the expenditures, especially development expenditures, and increased the 
revenue through tax receipts, by using the contractionary fiscal policy. 
 
5.3. Impulse Response Functions 
The responses of different variables through impulse response functions are 
obtained from a shock of one standard deviation. 
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Initially interest rate shock affects prices negatively because it reduces aggregate 
demand and output so prices go down but after some time we see slight increase in 
prices, due to higher interest rate cost of capital increases so in order to keep their profits 
unaffected producers will increase the prices. Prices will converge towards their long run 
equilibrium after eight years.  
Fiscal policy reacts pro-cyclically in response to interest rate shock. As a result, 
GDP increases and surplus ratio falls. Over long run GDP falls due to crowding out so 
surplus ratio increases. Fiscal surplus absorb the shock of interest rate after six years. 
In response to interest rate shock unemployment increases due to crowding out 
hypothesis. Unemployment starts to converge towards long run equilibrium after six 
years. 
 
5.3.2. Response to Price Shock 
 
 
In response to price shock monetary policy reacts strongly in a counter-cyclical 
manner by raising the policy rate. It takes eight years for interest rate to settle back to its 
original level. 
It takes four years for fiscal surplus ratio to completely absorb the price shock. Fiscal 
policy reacts in a pro-cyclical manner in response to price shock. Firstly, fiscal surplus ratio 
rises as inflation starts to affect output adversely, surplus tends to rise however, after some 
time, inflationary pressures induce GDP to grow causing ratio to fall.  
Unemployment shows fluctuating behaviour in response to price shock. Firstly 
unemployment decreases because real interest rate decreases that induces investment. 
Latter in long run price shock reduces the purchasing power of money and hence  
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5.3.3. Response to Unemployment Shock 
 
 
Prices initially show adverse effect of unemployment shock because; due to the 
unemployment shock aggregate demand reduces which brings the prices down. It takes 
seven years to completely absorb the unemployment shock.  
Like prices interest rate shows the same behaviour in response to unemployment 
shock. Initially interest rate declines because due to unemployment savings, investment, 
output and aggregate demand is low. Less demand for loanable funds brings interest rate 
down which eventually rises due to expansionary policy of the government. Convergence 
is achieved after seven years. 
The fiscal surplus ratio converges back to its long run path after ten years. 
Downward trend in fiscal surplus ratio can be explained with the reason that to tackle 
high unemployment, the government responds through expansionary fiscal policy which 
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5.3.4.  Response to Fiscal Surplus Ratio Shock 
 
 
The shock in surplus ratio is the result of contractionary fiscal policy; it decreases the 
prices in the economy. Prices converge to their long run equilibrium path after five years.  
Like prices the surplus shock also reduces the interest rate because the demand for 
loanable funds by the government decreases due to the contractionary fiscal policy, 
pushing down its price.  Long run equilibrium is achieved after seven years. 
Due to the fiscal surplus shock unemployment increases initially then it moves to 
the long run equilibrium path. The increase in surplus may be the result of less resource 
utilisation for investment purposes, which result in rising unemployment in the economy. 
Unemployment absorbs the surplus shock completely in more than ten years. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The objective of the paper is to test the empirical evidence of fiscal monetary 
coordination using annual data for Pakistan from 1980–2011. The results of the VAR 
model showed the evidence of weak coordination between the two institutions as both the 
fiscal and monetary policy variables affect each other but are insignificant. Further the 
results of the Granger Causality test provide no evidence of causality running from fiscal 
to monetary variables or from monetary to fiscal variables. Results of the Impulse 
Response Function showed that there is weak response of monetary shock to fiscal 
variables and also of fiscal shock to monetary variables. Interest rate adjusts to its 
original level almost after one decade and interest rate shock continues to affect fiscal 
surplus for about twenty years. The variables converge to their long run equilibrium after 
a very long time. Hence it may be concluded that there is weak or very little coordination 
among the policy makers. Arby and Hanif (2010) and Nasir, et al. (2010) also found 
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Fiscal and monetary policy are the two tools that run the economy, there should be 
coordination between two policies. Both need to be formulated in a coordinated way. For 
this purpose, more coordinated approach among the policy makers is needed in order to 
stabilise the economy and insulate it from external shocks to different variables. 
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